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Making The Workplace 'Safe' In
Capitalism:
The Enforcement of Factory Legislation in NineteenthCentury Ontario
Eric Tucker
No ONE HAS EVER ATTEMPTED to estimate the total number of workers
in Ontario who have been killed or injured, or whose health has been impaired, over the last 100 years as a result of their work. Even if a conservative estimate were produced, I have little doubt that most people would be
shocked, and would find that the toll was unacceptably high.' In 1985
alone, over 426,880 claims were filed with the Ontario Workers' Compensation Board,2 and experts agree that Board figures underestimate the true
significance of the problem.'
High levels of occupationally related death, injury, and disease have persisted over the last 100 years, notwithstanding that, throughout this period,
the state has had the legal authority to impose health and safety standards
on employers, and to implement those standards through a full-time inspectorate armed with substantial enforcement powers. The creation of this power
and the failure to exercise it effectively raises some difficult questions about
the role of the state in a capitalist social formation in general, and about
the relations between labour and the state in particular. It is the purpose of
'Recent increases in the number of claims filed with the Workers' Compensation Board in Ontario caused William Wrye, then provincial Minister of Labour, to comment, "There is, to be
frank, a distressing carnage in our workplaces which all of us are not adequately addressing."
Quoted in The Globe and Mail, 16 May 1986.
:
Ontario. Workers' Compensation Board, Annual Report (1986).
'T. Ison, The Dimensions of Industrial Disease (Kingston n9197 and d. Sass, "Workplpce
Health and Safety: Report From Canada," International Journal of Health Services, 16 11986),
565.
Eric Tucker, "Making The Workplace 'Safe' In Capitalism: The Enforcement of Factory Legislation in Nineteenth Century Ontario," LabourLeTravail, 21 (Spring 1988), 45-85.
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this paper to contribute to a discussion of these broad issues by examining
the early development of occupational health and safety regulation in Ontario. Why was the state empowered to regulate occupational health and safety
in the late nineteenth century, and why was this power exercised with such
little effect?
This paper will focus on the later question. Aside from considerations
of space, there are at least two reasons for concentrating on the implementation of Ontario's Factory Act* rather than on its enactment. First,
although no comprehensive study of the enactment of the Act has yet been
published, a number of well-known works have touched on the subject.' No
one, however, has yet examined the early implementation of that legislation.6 Second, the failure to study implementation reflects a tendency to
conceptualize the state as a monolithic structure that can be analyzed primarily
in terms of the activities of its more overt political institutions, processes,
and figures. While these are obviously significant, both instrumental^ and
symbolically, a critical component of our understanding of the role and dynamics of the capitalist state will be lost unless adequate attention is focused
on how state power is actually exercised by the officials on whom it is conferred.
The theoretical framework employed in this paper is premised on the view
that there are structural imperatives in a capitalist social formation that weigh
heavily on the choice and implementation of state policies. In particular, the
state is constrained by the need to facilitate capitalist accumulation or to maintain "business confidence." The failure to do so is threatening to the state
because it may lead to a decline in the level of private investment, which in
turn may cause a drop in government revenue and an economic recession
for which the state will be held responsible by the electorate. This pressure,
however, does not invariably translate into state policies that facilitate
capitalist accumulation. Dissatisfaction with the performance of the market
also generates pressure on the state to protect subordinate classes. If the state
fails to respond to this pressure it may suffer a loss of electoral support, or
worse, face disruptions to the social and economic order. Thus, state policy
is not determined by a logic of structural necessity. Rather, it is selected and

'The Ontario Factories' Act, 1884, ,.O. .184, ,c .9.
5
See Eugene Forsey, "A Note on the Dominion Factory Bills of the Eighteen-Eighties," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 11 31947), ,800 Bernnad Ostryy ,Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour in the 1880's," Canadian Journal of Economics ana Political Science,
27 (1961), 141; and Gregory S. Kealey, Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial Capitalism
1867-1892 2Toronto o980). Also oee, ,inda aohnen, ,Women Workers in Ontario: A Socioo
Legal History," U.T. Fac. L. Rev., 31 (1973), 45.
'The only sustained study of the enforcement of factory legislation in Ontario is Michael Piva,
The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto - 1900-1921 (Ottawa 19197 and, as the title
indicates, it does not deal with the period from 1886-1900.
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implemented within a set of potentially contradictory constraints. Furthermore, these constraints do not exist independently of the actions taken by
dominant and subordinant classes, even though these actions are themselves
conditioned by a structural logic. Therefore, it is critical that we examine
both the structural processes of capitalist development and the political organization and ideological orientation of different classes in order to understand state policy at a particular historical juncture.'
However, I also reject the view that the state's actions can be understood
solely by reference to structural processes and class struggles taking place
outside the state. Internal characteristics of the state including, its federal
structure, the division of power between its legislative, executive and judicial branches, and its bureaucratic organization mediate social and political
processes and affect state policy. As well, there are highly specific and,
perhaps, contingent factors operating. Finally, no account of nineteenth century factory legislation can be complete if it focuses on class to the exclusion
of gender. The development of industrial capitalism undermined familial
patriarchy by removing the material basis of the father/husband's control
over the family. State intervention needs to be analyzed from this perspective as well.8
By way of general background, then, the following points should be noted. Southern Ontario experienced a period of rapid industrial growth in the
second half of the nineteenth century. Although this development was uneven, there can be no doubt that industrial capitalism emerged as a major
force affecting the lives of Canadian workers.' The introduction of steam
powered machinery, new technologies, and large crowded workplaces combined with the intensification of the labour process through speed-ups, higher
levels of supervision and discipline, piece work wages, and sweating produced
serious occupational health and safety hazards for workers. As well, the introduction of wage labour drew women and children into the industrial labour
force in increasing numbers. They were largely excluded from jobs traditionally performed by craftsmen, at least so long as craft control could be main-

This framework reflects the views of neo-Marxist writers on the state including Claus Offe,
Contradictions of the Welfare etata (Cambridge 1984); Jurgen nabermas, Legitimation Crisis
(Boston 1975); and Eric Olin Wright, Class, Crisis snd the etate (Londoo n978). For ra nxcellent review of Marxist theories of the state see Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theorr
(Princeton 1984). For a study of the development of state labour policy that applies this approach see Paul Craven, 'An Impartial Umpire': Industrial Relations and the Canadian State
1900-1911 (Toronto o980)0 ,57-77; 353-8.
Jane Ursel, "The State and the Maintenance of Patriarchy: A case study of Family, Labour
and Welfare Legislation in Canada," in James Dickinson and Bob Russel, eds.. Family, Economy and State (London 1986), 150.
For an overview of this development see Kealey & Palmer, Dreaming of What Might Be: The
Knights of Labor in Ontario, 1880-1899 (Cambridge e982), chap. .1
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tained, and instead were ghettoized in positions that paid half the wages rates
of men.
Initially, the state, through the courts, opted for a system of market regulation. That is, the courts refused to establish any obligation on employers
to provide minimum levels of protection to employees. Rather, the matter
was left to the labour market. In legal theory, workers and employers were
juridical equals who met in the marketplace to bargain over the terms and
conditions of employment. Other things being equal, workers would demand
additional compensation to perform riskier jobs. Indeed, the courts constructed a legal presumption that workers had voluntarily assumed the risks that
were present in their workplaces, including the risk of injury from the acts
of fellow servants. Employers facing worker demands for risk premiums
would decide whether it was cheaper to pay the premium or reduce the risk.
The market would aggregate these individual decisions and economically efficient levels of health and safety would be produced.10
One way that workers responded to the selection of market regulation
by the courts was to call on politicians to legislate minimum standards.
Although this demand was initially made in the 1870s, it was not until the
1880s when labour was much better organized, that they were able to bring
sustained pressure on the state to take action. Workers, however, were not
the only group seeking state regulation of factories. Middle class reformers,
imbued with Victorian notions of the family and femininity, saw the employment of women and children in factories as a dangerous practice,
threatening to undermine the moral and physical foundations of the social
order. Women were seen to be more physically vulnerable to the rigours of
factory work, especially with regard to their reproductive capacity, and there
was great concern that moral standards would decline if the sexes were not
separated at work. Reformers also feared that children's physical development would be stunted, and that without proper education, they would develop into a class dangerous to the community. Thus, they too sought to
have the state intervene to prevent these developments. Canadian manufacturers generally opposed factory legislation, but the Canadian Manufacturers'
Association (CMA) was resigned to its inevitability. They recognized that
factory legislation was a regular feature of industrialized economies and, as
such, saw it as part of the price of the National Policy. They sought to delay
its enactment and to insure that its impact would be moderate. In particular, they were concerned that power conferred on inspectors should be constrained, fearing that pro-labour inspectors would be appointed.
Although most political lobbying was directed at the Dominion government, factory legislation was first enacted provincially. For the Ontario Liber10
Tucker, "The Law of Employers' Liability in Ontario 1861-1900: the Search for A Theory,"
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 22(1984), 213.
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als under Mowat, the enactment of factory legislation provided an
opportunity to simultaneously consolidate labour support and to assert a
broad interpretation of the province's constitutional powers in circumstances
in which it would be embarrassing for the Dominion government to challenge
them. Although the Act was passed in 1884, it was not declared in force until 1886." This allowed the Liberals to claim credit with workers without
needlessly antagonizing manufacturers. During this time the courts adopted
a more de-centralized view of the British North America Act and the provincial Liberals sought to draw the Dominion government into litigation, but
they declined. In 1886, the Liberals were able to claim credit with workers
again by declaring the Act in force just on the eve of the appointment of
the Royal Commission into Relations Between Labour and Capital by the
Macdonald government.
The content of Ontario's factory act was shaped by these political forces.
There were three kinds of provisions in the Act: those specifically regulating
child and female labour; those regulating all factory work; and those dealing with administration and enforcement. It should be noted that the Act
had limited application. As it name implies, it only applied to persons employed in factories. The Act did not define employee, but it did exclude persons engaged in repair work from its protection (s. 23). Section 2(1) defined
factories broadly, but specifically exempted places employing less than twenty
persons and, in some cases, private dwelling houses from its provisions. As
well, section 21 exempted some private dwellings and factories not employing children and young girls from specific provisions relating to health conditions, posting and accident reporting requirements.
Children were defined as persons under the age of fourteen, and young
girls were defined as girls between the ages of 14 and 18 (s. 2(5) and 2(6)).
Section 5 imposed a general prohibition on the employment of children, young
girls or women under conditions in which it would be likely that their health
would be permanently injured. Violators were subject to imprisonment for
six months or to a fine of up to $100 plus costs. Section 6 of the Act specified a number of circumstances under which a violation of section 5 would
be deemed to have occurred. First, it was unlawful to employ a boy under
the age of 12 and a girl under the age of 14.i: Boys between the ages of 12
to 14 could be employed provided the employer obtained a certificate attesting to the child's age from the parent or guardian (s. 6(2)). The parents of
an under-age child found working in a factory were liable to be fined up
to $50.00 or imprisoned for up to 3 months (s. 17). To facilitate the enforcement of these age restrictions, the Act stipulated that persons found on facPublic Archives of Ontario, RG3, O.C. 20/429, Order-in-Council, 5 Oct. 1886.
"Section 6(1). The original Bill made it illegal to employ children under twelve regardless of
gender. It was amended at the urging of the TTLC to extend greater protection to young girls.
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tory premises were deemed to be employees and that if a child appeared to
the court to be under-age, the burden lay on the defendant to prove the child
was of legal age (s. 3). Second, a ten hour day and a sixty-hour week were
established as the maximum hours of work for children, young girls and women, although the Act allowed some flexibility in order to permit a short day's
work on Saturday (s. 6(3)). The Act also provided that the LieutenantGovernor could make regulations empowering the Inspector to issue overtime permits under certain circumstances, provided that work did not begin
before 6 a.m. or end after 9 p.m., that hours did not exceed more than 12
1/2 in a day, or 72 in a week, and that overtime was not worked more than
six weeks a year." As well, section 9 required employers to maintain a
register of overtime worked pursuant to the inspector's permit. Notice of
the hours of work was required to be posted on prescribed forms. Third,
women and children were entitled to a one hour lunch break and the inspector was given the authority to order that lunch not be taken in a work room,
but rather in a suitable dining room provided by the employer at his own
expense. Finally, the Act prohibited women and children from performing
certain duties that could be performed legally by adult males. Section 7 made
it unlawful to allow women and children to clean machinery while it was
in motion and children and young girls were prohibited from working in certain positions around powered machinery in motion.
The second set of provisions provided protection for all workers in factories. Section 14 imposed a general duty on employers not to "keep a factory so that the safety of any person employed therein is endangered, or so
that the health of any person employed therein is likely to be permanently
injured."14 Violators were subject to a fine of up to $500.00 or imprisonment for up to one year. The Act deemed a number of conditions to be violations of section 14. For example, section 11 created minimum standards
regarding cleanliness, overcrowding, ventilation and closet accommodation,
including a requirement for separate closet facilities for men and women.
Section 12 required employers to comply with orders made by the inspectorate in relation to the above matters within a reasonable time. As well,
the section specifically gave the inspector the authority to order that mechanical means, approved by regulation, be installed in order to eliminate injurious levels of dust. Section 15 required fencing of machinery "as far as
practicable;" guarding openings of hoistways etc.; and safety devices for elevators. Section 16 created standards with respect to fire safety including: the
provision of fire extinguishers "as the Inspector, acting under the regulations made in that behalf, directs in writing;" outwardly opening exit doors;

"Section 8. The circumsiances in which overtime was permitted included machinery breakdown
and "the customs and exigencies of certain trades."
l4
The original Bill did not include a general duty to protect the health of the worker.
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and fire escapes of certain specifications, "Provided, always, that any of
the requirements of this sub-section may be dispensed with in any factory
if the inspector so directs.""
The last set of provisions related to administration and enforcement. The
Act provided for the appointment of one inspector by the LieutenantGovernor in Council (s. 2(2)). The inspector was empowered to enter and
inspect factories at all reasonable times without a warrant, unless the premises
were also used as a dwelling (s. 25(1), 26). For the purposes of ascertaining
whether factories complied with health requirements of section 12, the inspector was authorized to call upon the assistance of a physician or local
health officer (s. 13). In any case where there was fear of obstruction, the
inspector could call upon a constable for assistance (s. 25(3)). As well, the
inspector was empowered to require the production of registers or other documents required to be kept by the Act, and to examine any person found in
a factory with respect to the requirements of the Act (s. 25(2), 25(4)-(6)).
Finally, the inspector was given general authority to "exercise such other
powers as may be necessary for carrying this Act into effect" (s. 25(7)). Any
person who obstructed an inspector in the execution of his or her duty was
liable to a fine (s.25).
In order to assist the inspector, employers were required, in some circumstances, to notify the inspector in writing within six days of deaths or
serious injuries requiring employees to be off work for more than six days
(s. 18, 19)," and to notify the inspector within one month after they began
to occupy a factory (s.28(l)). The Act also required that certain notices be
given to employees, including, notice of the provisions of the Act ("as the
Inspector deems necessary"), and notice of the name and address of the inspector (s. 29).
Prosecutions under the Act were to be brought before two justices of the
peace in the county in which the offence was alleged to have been committed (s. 39). Informations had to be laid within two or three months after
the commission of the offence (s. 38(1)), depending on the offence. Convictions were not to be quashed for defects in form, and there was a preclusion
of certiorari except for the purposes of hearing a special case (s. 38(6))) In
addition to the power to fine or imprison, the court was given the authority
to order that certain means be adopted in order to bring the factory into
conformity with the Act (s. 32).

The discretion to dispense with the fire safety requirements was not in the original Bill.
T"he original Bill required that notice be given whenever the injury required the worker to be
off work for forty-eight hours.
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I
The Implementation of the Act, 1886-1900
on 1 December 1886, no arrangements
for its enforcement were made until the spring of 1887. Clearly, these arrangements were critically important if the Act was to protect workers. The
Act vested inspectors with broad discretionary powers to determine its operative meaning, and the government determined the resources committed to
factory act enforcement. The most important question was not whether the
state and its agents had then sufficiently empowered, but rather whether,
and to what extent those powers would be exercised for the benefit of workers.
ALTHOUGH THE ACT CAME INTO FORCE

A. Setting Up the Administration of Enforcement
Manufacturers and workers realized this and actively lobbied the government to insure that arrangements satisfactory to their interests were made.
In response to earlier Dominion bills, manufacturers had expressed their concerns regarding implementation, and in particular, the powers given to the
inspectorate." Thus, it was not surprising that when a special meeting of
the CMA was held on 30 November 1886 to discuss the Ontario Act, most
of its provisions were found to be unobjectionable, "if properly applied, but
there was also considerable anxiety displayed at the unlimited powers vested
in the factory inspectors.'"" A committee of leading industrialists, including H. A. Massey, J. Inglis, and Frederic Nicholls, was appointed to meet
with Mowat to discuss the appointment of inspectors. At that meeting, the
committee expressed its concern over the inspector's powers and its fear that
a pro-labour inspector, whose decisions would be virtually unappealable,
could put manufacturers to immeasurable expense. The delegation proposed
that the government should appoint competent and impartial men drawn from
the ranks of labour and capital so that, in the event of a dispute, consultation would be facilitated.1''
The Toronto Trades and Labor Council (TTLC) was equally active in
lobbying the government. Even before the Act was declared in force, efforts
were made to have local inspectors appointed. x Subsequent to its proclama'For example, at a meeting of the Ontario Manufacturers' Association called to discuss the
Dominion Bill of 1883, it was agreed that too much power was given to the inspectors and that
there were insufficient safeguards for manufacturers "who might become their victims." The
Globe, 28 April, 1883.
'"Public Archives of Canada, Canadian Manufacturers Association Papers, MG 28, 1230,
Minutes, Special Meeting, 30 Nov. 1886; Globe, 1 Dec. 1886.
'^Canadian Manufacturer, 6 May 1187. .hereinnfter CM)
!0
See The Globe, 3 Sept. 1884 for an account of a discussion in the Fire and Gas Committee
of Toronto City Council about appointing a local factory inspector or petitioning the provincial government to do so.
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tion, meetings were held in November 1886 at which resolutions were passed
calling on the government to appoint inspectors who possessed the confidence of wage earners at large, and who were either nominated, or at least
approved by labour organizations. Potential nominees were discussed, but
it was not deemed expedient to forward specific candidates for consideration by the government.21 The Toronto Evening News published an editorial
supporting labour's concerns over the appointment process.
A good deal of wire pulling is going on with regard to the appointment of Inspectors of
factories
Some persons are mentioned who have no qualifications whatever ... other than
that always essential one in the eyes of a party government, activity as political heelers. We
do not, of course, expect anything so Utopian as the appointment of any official on the sole
ground of fitness
But the labour organizations do expect that the inspectors ... shall, in addition, be competent men, and in synpathy with the cause of Labour Reform. If mere timeservers and political heelers are chosen, the Act will be a failure.22

As a result of these lobbying efforts, and others, two amendments to the
Act were introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 7 April 1887 by the
government. The first created a special exemption from the prohibition on
child labour, while the second provided for the appointment of regional inspectors instead of the single inspector that was provided for in the original
Act. Although both labour and capital supported the appointment of more
than a single inspector, their reasons for doing so were quite different. The
CMA feared that if only one was appointed, he would likely be a labour
supporter. Therefore, they favoured the appointment of at least two inspectors, but probably not many more, in the hope that the second would have
the confidence of the manufacturers. Labour, on the other hand, wanted
local inspectors to be appointed in order to ensure that sufficient resources
would be devoted to enforcement. William Meredith, leader of the Tory opposition, sought to enhance his party's standing amongst workers by proposing that there should be an inspector for each county appointed by the country
council. C. F. Fraser, Commissioner of the Department of Public Works,
replied that this would be impossible and that the government did not intend to appoint more than two inspectors.'1 This position was in line with
the views of the CMA.24 The amendments were passed and received Royal
Assent on 23 April 1887."
This cleared the way for the appointment of inspectors, but still did not
resolve the question of how many would be appointed, from what backgrounds they would come and how the province would be divided between
them. The government ultimately decided to appoint three inspectors instead
" Toronto Trades and Labour Council, Minutes, 5, 19 Nov. 1886.
"Toronto Evening News, 22 April 1887.
"Ontario. Legislative Debates, Globe, 20 April 1887.
~ACW, 6 May 1887.

" S.O. 1887 c.35 (Ont.).
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of two as Fraser had earlier declared. Although the reasons for this are unclear, if may have been done to counter Meredith's attempt to outflank the
government by supporting labour's preference for the appointment of numerous local inspectors.26
Whether the CMA or labour organizations were consulted with respect
to particular individuals is unknown,27 but the strategy followed by the
government seems fairly apparent upon examination of the appointments
made by Order in Council on 25 June 1887, effective 1 July.28 The province
was divided into three districts with an inspector for each one. Robert Barber, a manufacturer from Toronto was appointed inspector of the western
district, including Toronto west of Yonge Street. James R. Brown, a mechanic
from Oshawa was appointed inspector of the central district, including the
eastern half of Toronto, and O. A. Rocque, an ex-alderman from Ottawa,
was appointed inspector for the eastern district. Thus, we can see that the
politically sensitive, and heavily industrialized south central area was divided between two inspectors, one drawn from the ranks of labour, and the
other from the ranks of the manufacturers. Meanwhile, the less industrialized eastern and northern areas of the province were assigned to Rocque,
who, as far as can be determined, was a patronage appointment, pure and
simple. Further, as between Barber and Brown, Barber was given the more
heavily industrialized western sector.29 The pro-government Globe greeted
the announcement of the appointments predictably. They congratulated the
government "on having secured the services of men so competent and at the
same time so acceptable to all whose interests are concerned in the just and
fair administration of the factory laws.'"0

" See Public Archives of Ontario, R.G.15, Series S-2, No. 1014, Letter from Edwards, Secretary, Public Works Department, Ontario, to William Mack, MPP, Cornwall in response to
a petition he presented signed by citizens of Cornwall in May-June, 1888, calling for the appointment of a local inspector. The pattern of party competition for labour support during
this period has been noted by numerous commentators including Kealey, Toronto Workers.
In a debate over factory inspection that took place at the Seventh Annual Conference of the
Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLCC) held in 1891, A. W. Wright, a labour "leader" with a rather checkered career (see, Kealey and Palmer, Dreaming, 177-87) asserted that
labour organizations were not consulted in the appointment of inspectors. See, The Labour
Advocate, 11 Sept. 1891. With regard to the CMA, a circular letter dated 29 April, 1887 called
for a general meeting to discuss, amongst other issues, recommendations for the appointment
of a factory inspector. However, the Minutes of the meeting that took place on 4 May do not
indicate whether the question was discussed.
"Public Archives of Ontario, R.G.3, O.C. 21/288.
' See Ontario, Department of Public Works, Report of the Inspectors of Factories, 1888
(Toronto 1889). (Note: The Report was published annually in the Sessional Papers of the Province.
After 1888, the Inspectors reported to the Department of Agriculture. These reports are hereinafter cited Inspectors of Factories, Year.)
"Globe, 23 June 1887.
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Little is known about the backgrounds of Barber and Rocque beyond
the brief descriptions given above." James Brown's career prior to his appointment is better documented. His roots as a labour activist reach back
to the nine hour movement of 1872 during which he emerged as a labour
spokesman in Oshawa. He helped establish a branch of the Knights of Labour
in Oshawa in 1882 and served as secretary of the Oshawa Trades and Labour
Council, as well as chairman of its Legislative Committee." However, he
also had a connection with the Liberal Party through D.J. O'Donoghue, and
acted as the Oshawa correspondent for the Ontario Bureau of Industries after it began collecting labour statistics."
Neither the CMA nor the TTLC commented on the appointments.
However, it is quite likely that Brown's appointment disturbed the CMA.
Not only was he an active and militant trade unionist, he had seriously antagonized employers in Oshawa earlier in the 1880s by arguing that labour
should be made the measure of all value in order to prepare the way "for
industrial co-operation on an equitable basis." Such a step would, in Brown's
view, "revolutionize the world."54 He, along with numerous other labour
activists of the time, was influenced by the ideas of Henry George, and had
urged the delegates to the Labour Congress convention of 1883 to study
Poverty and Progress." -hortly bbfore his sppointment was snnounced, ,h
became embroiled in a nasty exchange with the CMA over resolutions he
had introduced as a delegate to the TLCC convention in September 1886.
Petitions to the government based on these resolutions were attacked by the
CMA, and Brown defended them vigorously in a letter to the CMA dated
16 May 1887.
It is a sad commentary on the boasted civilization and Christianity of the age that the selfishness and greed of one class of the community has enabled that class to successfully manipulate the representatives of the people, and to obtain the power which enables that class to set
at defiance the petitions of labour for justice.
The over-bearing arrogance of employers towards employees is too often the cause of strikes,
and the indifference of employers to the welfare of workers has been the cause of untold suffering.

The CMA was alarmed by Brown's letter and on 23 May, they reproduced
it in a circular calling for an emergency meeting to discuss it." The outcome
"in R. L. Polk and Co. 's Toronto City Directory (1884-5), a firm by tht name of Robert Barber Jr. & Co. is listed as a manufacturer of woollen goods. O. A. Rocque served as an alderman
in Ottawa from 1872-76. See, Historical Sketch oofhe County of Carlton (Tororto 1879) 9)6-76
"Kealey and Palmer, Dreaming, 342--3
"The Bureau began collecting labour statistics in 1883 at the request of the Labour Congress
which met in Toronto in December, 1883. For Brown's report on Oshawa see Ontario, Bureau
of Industries, Annual Report, 1884 (Toronto 1188), Ixxiii
"Quoted in Kealey and Palmer, Dreaming, 3433
"Cited in Ramsay Cook, The Regenerators: Social Criticism in Late Victorian English Canada (Toronto 1985), 114.
"*See CMA, Circular Letters, 23 May 1887.
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of the meeting is unknown, but the antagonism between Brown and the CMA
intensified when Brown spoke out against legislation introduced into the
Dominion Parliament on 10 June 1886 designed to break the control of Quebec dock workers who were able to make membership in their association
a condition of employment." On 1 July, ,he day Brown's appointment became effective, CM ran an editorial rebuking him for supporting trade union interference with individual rights of contract. In the same issue of CM,
the appointment of the factory inspectors was noted without comment.'8
The inspectors were initially placed under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Works, C. F. Fraser. They received an annual salary
of $1,000 dollars and ample provision was made for their expenses.w Upon
assuming their duties on 1 July 1887, the inspectors were instructed to use
the remainder of the year to make informal visits to the larger factories under their jurisdictions for the purpose of introducing themselves, distributing copies of the Act and ascertaining the degree of compliance with the
Act.4" These instructions were reflected in the descriptions of the inspectors'
visits provided by witnesses appearing before the Royal Commission on Relations of Labour and Capital in the fall of 1887." Thus, it is not surprising that the Second Report of the Royal Commission found that existing
factory legislation was largely inoperative."
While the inspectors were out in the field introducing themselves, the
government made additional arrangements for the enforcement of the Act.
A regulation was prepared which prescribed various forms to be used for

' For an explanation of the bill see Canada, House of Commons, Debates ((887), 862.
"CM, 1 July 11887 Subsequent to his appointmentt CM crittcized Brown for some comments
he made on the dock workers' legislation and for advocating the nationalization of the railways. CM never criticized the government for appointing Brown, and they never criticized him
for his activities as a factory inspector.
"Public Archives of Ontario, R.G. 3, O.C. 21/288, Order-in-Council, 25 June 1887 contains
the terms of their appointment. The annual travel expenses incurred by inspectors Brown and
Barber averaged between $500.00-600.00 each. Inspector Rocque's were considerably less. The
expenses incurred in enforcing the Act were reported annually in Public Accounts, published
in the province's Sessional Papers.
"'See, Inspectors of Factories, ,888, 8 (per Barberbe ana Brown's testimono before ret Royal
Commission on Relations Between Labour and Capital (RCRLC) given in fall 1887. See RCRLC,
Evidence-Ontario (Ottawa 1189), 311520.
"For example, Thewilis Day, superintendent of the Cornwall Manufacturing Co., Cornwall,
described how Inspector Rocque went through the factory's twelve rooms in 25-30 minutes,
without consulting any of the operatives, and declared himself satisfied. RCRLC, Evidence,
1071-2. Also see the testimony of Samuel Peddle, cabinetmaker, London, 633. The only manufacturer who reported receiving directions from an inspector was Joseph Firstbrooke, a Toronto
box manufacturer, who was instructed by Inspector Brown to place a trap door over a hatchway, 312.
4
"RCRLC, Second Reportt 79. The first report did not comment on the implementation of the
Act. but did make recommendations for its enforcement. RCRLC. First Report, 11.
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giving notices and for keeping registries required by the Act. It gave the inspectors authority to grant overtime permits pursuant to section 8, subject
to prior approval by the Commissioner of Public Works. Finally, section
7 of the regulations instructed the inspectors to take into account "any special circumstances" which in their opinion "should be considered on behalf
of the employers" when issuing remedial orders for violations of the health
requirements of section 11.4] Arrangements were elso made with labour rnions to have their members' complaints funnelled through the union to the
inspectors and the inspectors were instructed to receive complaints in this
manner.44 There is no record of other instructions from the government to
the inspectors.4'
B. The Inspectors Take to the Field
In evaluating the implementation of factory legislation, it is necessary
to face the challenge posed by some recent writers who dispute the 'standard' account of the ineffectiveness of factory regulation. The 'standard'
account notes the inspectors' failure to vigorously exercise their prosecutorial
powers and concludes that the Act was largely unenforced. The failure to
prosecute employers is linked to a broader analysis of the limited ability of
the state to regulate against the interests of capital because of the significance
of class power. The 'conventionalization' of factory crime was a means of
blunting the impetus towards regulation in order to avoid the untenable spectacle of the state criminalizing the behaviour of the most powerful social
class.46
The essence of the revisionist critique is that the standard account incorrectly assumes that compliance could only be achieved by means of prosecution. It is their thesis that the inspectors chose persuasion and bargaining
as an alternative enforcement strategy, and that this choice was justified because it made more efficient use of the limited enforcement resources avail-

Public Archives of Ontario, R.G. 3, O.C. 21/530 The Ontario Faclories' Regulations (first
series), 1887, issued 29 November 1887.
See, Report upon the Sweating System in Canada, Supplementary Report (House of Commons, Session Paper 61a, 1896), 32, where Inspector Brown reported that, at the time of his
appointment, he was informed by C. F. Fraser, then Commissioner of Public Works, that a
reporting arrangement had been worked out with the unions. Brown also referred to Fraser's
original directive in his last report as an inspector. See Inspectors of Factories, 1902, 18.
Inspector Brown was asked in his appearance before the RCRl.C, "Have you been instructed to use persuasion rather than to prosecute?" Before Brown answered the Chairman interrupted to suggest that the question was improper, and no answer was given. See RCRLC,
Evidence, 320.
^"he most sophisticated presentation of this thesis is that of W. G. Carson, "The Conventionalization of Early Factory Crime," International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 7 (1979),
175.
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able. Not only does this analysis serve to vindicate the inspectors by depicting
them as ingenious and spirited individuals, battling against stiff odds in an
attempt to implement the legislation. It also serves to vindicate a positive
perception of the liberal, pluralist democratic state by denying the significance
of class power in determining the behaviour of the state and its agents. Instead, it portrays the state as an effective instrument for articulating and
achieving outcomes that reflect community consensus.47
This critique forces us to confront the fact that there are a range of enforcement strategies, and that the mere fact that a prosecutorial strategy was
not chosen is not, in itself, sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that
legislation was not enforced. In examining the enforcement process in Ontario we will first identify the strategy selected by the inspectors, and then
assess the reasons for its selection and its impact on the way compliance came
to be defined by the inspectors.
C. Enforcement Strategy: Prosecution or Persuasion
In a prosecution model of enforcement, heavy reliance is placed on the
detection, prosecution and punishment of violators. In a persuasion model,
the emphasis is on bargaining in order to secure "voluntary" compliance.
These models can be seen to mark the end points of a continuum. In practice, most enforcement agencies use some mixture of prosecutorial and persuasion strategies. Our first task is to identify and locate the strategy adopted
by the Ontario's factory inspectors on this punishment-persuasion continuum.
The model of enforcement that was adopted form the time formal enforcement of the Act commenced on 1 January 1888 to the end of fhe century was that of persuasion, practically to the exclusion of any coercive element
whatsoever. This is clearly indicated by Table 1 below.
The table shows that in the first 12 years of the Act's operation a total of
35 charges were prosecuted. Four charges were laid against parents for allowing their under-age children to work. In a number of instances, several
charges were laid against a single employer, and so the total number of em4,

See, Bartrip & Fenn, "The Conventionalization of Factory Crime - A Re-assessment, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 8 (1980), 175 and "The Evolution of Regulatory
Style in the Nineteenth Century British Factory Inspectorate," Journal of Law & Society, ,0
(1983), 201. Also see Harry Arthurs, 'Without the Law'' Administrative Justice ana Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto o985), 103-111 who is more sensisive to class factors, but who, nevertheless, sees factory inspectors as a proto-type of the model professional
administrator who vindicates his faith in public administration and legal pluralism.
There is a burgeoning literature that explains current enforcement practices on a similar basis.
For example, see Hawkins, "Bargain and Bluff: Compliance Strategy and Deterrence in the
Enforcement of Regulation, Lawi. Politics Quarterly, 5 (1983), 33 and deljanovskik ""egulatory Enforcement: An Economic Study of the British Factory Inspectorate," Law & Politics
Quarterly, 5 (1983), 75.
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TABLE 1
Prosecutions 1888-1900
No. of Charges Prosecuted
Year

Barber

1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900

1

Totals

3

Brown
10

5
5

1

Rocque

Total
1
10

5

5
5
0
1
0
0
2
0
5
1
5

31

35

1
5

!•

•Not mentioned in inspector's reports, but reported in R.V. Weir (1899) 20 CL. T. .32.
Source: Report of the Inspectors of Factories, 1888-1900.

ployers prosecuted is less than 31. On average, less than three charges were
prosecuted per year. Of these, all but two were for violations of the provi
sions regarding the employment of women and children and hours of work
in bake shops. In the two cases involving violations of health and safety pro
visions of general application, one related to ventilation," while the other
involved a breach of the general duties clause." During this same period,
there were 207 reported fatal accidents and 2,632 reported accidents causing
serious injury. In none of these cases was the employer prosecuted for violat
ing the Act.»
One further point must be noted. Thirty-one out of the 35 charges
48

In 1898 Thomas Carroll was fined $2.00 for failing to provide adequate ventilation of dust
for emery wheels. Inspectors of Factories, ,89898,.
n
R. ν. Weir (1899)) 20 C.L.T. .32. Thh eefendant was sconicted aa tirst instance, ,bu tth eco
viction was quashed on the ground that three out of the seven persons present in the factory
were employers. This reduced the number of employees to four, below the treshold for the ap
plication of the Ac.
"The inspectors annually reported on the accidents in their districts. In two cases in which boys
between 12 and 14 were seriously injured or killed, the employer was prosecuted for failing
to obtain a certificate of age. Inspectors of Factories, ,891, 1,1
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prosecuted were initiated by Inspector Brown. This suggests that he was far
more willing than his colleagues to resort to prosecution as an element of
the enforcement process. The reasons for this difference, and its significance
for our understanding the choice of enforcement strategy generally, will be
explored in the following sections of the paper.
Did the inspectors choose persuasion because it was more efficient as the
revisionists suggest, or did they do so because of the pervasive influence of
class power? It will be argued here that the efficiency explanation does not
escape the reality of class power, but merely masks it. This occurs because
that approach treats the material and ideological constraints under which
the inspectors operated as natural facts, unrelated to class and politics. This
will be shown to be an untenable assumption.
The resources devoted to enforcement of the Act were inadequate from
the outset, and the situation deteriorated during the 1890's. In 1888, Barber
found 375 factories in his district which spread out over 18 counties and the
western half of the City of Toronto. Brown found 224 factories spread out
over 16 countries and the eastern half of the City of Toronto. Rocque did
not report the number of factories in his jurisdiction but, we can safely assume that there were fewer than in Brown's, and that they were even more
widely dispersed over nine counties and six districts. Barber reported that
on his first formal inspection tour he was able to visit all the factories in
his district by October, and then was able to conduct repeat visits of factories employing women and children. One can imagine the cursory nature of
the inspections that were conducted in order to cover so much ground so
quickly. As well, the inspectors claimed that they managed to visit factories
within their districts that were not covered by the Act/1
The workload of the inspectors increased substantially in 1889 as a result
of an amendment to the Act which made factories employing more than five
persons subject to its provisions/2 Inspector Barber reported that the alteration in the definition of a factory more than trebled the number of establishments requiring inspection." Despite this enormous increase in
workload, there was no increase in the complement of inspectors until 1895
when Margaret Carlyle was appointed as female inspector of factories with
a jurisdiction limited to issues affecting child and female labour.54 By 1901
there were 6,543 manufacturing establishments in Ontario employing more

Inspectors of Factories, ,888.
The Ontario Factories' Amendment Act, 18899,.O. .188 9.43, s. .(2).
"inspectors of Factories 1189, 6.
4
In her first years on the job she claimed to cover so much ground that, by comparison, her
male colleagues' looked like slackers. In her first half year she made 611 inspections in 43 cities
and in her first full year, she inspected 986 establishments, many of them several times. Inspectors of Factories, 1895, 22 3nd Inspectors of Factories, 1896, 20.
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than five persons, and still only four inspectors." As well, the factory inspectors were given responsibilities under legislation regulating bake shops
in 1896 and commercial shops in 1897.5*
Although the resources of the inspectors were not as thinly spread in 1888
as they were in 1901, the problem of limited resources always constrained
their selection of enforcement strategies. A strategy that heavily depended
on frequent and thorough inspections to detect and remedy violations of the
Act was simply not feasible under the circumstances. A negotiation strategy
may have been more efficient. But, even if it was, it is important to remember that negotiating compliance is not a costless strategy. The ability of inspectors to effectively pursue this strategy would also be constrained by
resource scarcity. Indeed, it is likely that inadequate enforcement resources
were a more direct and significant determinant of the limited impact of factory legislation than was the choice of enforcement strategy.
Moreover, the scarcity of resources was not a natural condition, but a
politically created fact. While it is clear that the state would not, indeed,
could not, provide unlimited resources for the enforcement of the Act, and
in that sense scarcity was inevitable, the important issue was the degree of
scarcity. The question of the initial commitment of resources to enforcement
was, as noted, the subject of dispute between labour, which sought the appointment of numerous local inspectors, and the government, which thought
the proposal "impossible."" The decision to appoint three inspectors did
not end the matter. Labour continually complained about inadequate enforcement and lobbied the government to appoint additional inspectors and
to provide permanent ones for manufacturing centres.58 The decision to
limit the resources available for enforcement was clearly a political one, taken
in the context of the class politics of the period, and not simply an expres-

"Census of Canada, ,901. Prior lo 1901, census dada was collected with respect to all manufacturers regardless of their size. It is therefore impossible to use that data as a basis for calculating the inspectors' workload. From 1901 onwards, data was only collected for manufacturers
employing five or more persons.
*The Bake Shops' Act, 1896, ,.O. .896, c. 64, ss .9 An Act respecting Shops ana Places other
than Factories, S.O. 11897 ,c 511 ,ss 2(b), ,8(2). The later Acc gave the Lieutenant Goveenor
in Council power to appoint inspectors, but did not stipulate that they were to be the factory
inspectors. Nevertheless, the factory inspectors were made inspectors under this Act. See Public Archives of Ontario, R.G. 3, O.C. 34/426, Order-in-Council dated 8 May 1897.
'See above.
For example, in the spring of 1888 the government received a petition signed by 470 citizens
of Cornwall requesting the appointment of a local inspector. Public Archives of Ontario, R.G.
15, Series S-2, No. 1014. Later that year the TLCC passed a resolution calling on the government to appoint local inspectors. Resolutions to the same effect were also passed in 1891 and
1897. See TLCC, Proceedings sor rhe above years and Thh Labour Advocate, ,1 Sept. .1911
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sion of some undifferentiated community consensus."
The lack of resources was not the only constraint on the inspectors when
selecting an enforcement strategy. The inspectors also had to consider political controls on their behaviour and to cope with the administrative arrangements made for the prosecution of cases. In Ontario neither the decision to
prosecute, nor the conduct of the prosecution were entirely in the hands of
the inspector. Although practices may have varied, there is evidence to suggest that the inspectors were required to consult with the Deputy AttorneyGeneral before laying charges and that the actual prosecution was left to the
local Crown Attorney.** However, it is not clear whether this aspect of the
arrangements constrained the inspectors' freedom to prosecute. There is at
least one case in which an inspector was advised not to prosecute6' but, in
another, Inspector Brown was criticized by the Attorney-General's department for only prosecuting three out of a possible eighteen charges against
an employer who had worked female employees in excess of the hours permitted under the Act.62 Indeed, in that same report Inspector Brown indicated that the Deputy Attorney-General had expressed the view that sufficient
time had elapsed for employers to become acquainted with the provisions
of the Act and that ignorance was no longer an excuse for its contravention.6' This suggests that it was not resistance from the Attorney-General's
office that was constraining the inspectorate. Rather, the evidence suggests
that permission to prosecute was rarely sought by the inspectors in the first
place.64
This may have been due to the government's reputed attitude toward
prosecution rather than to any direct interference by the Attorney-General's
office. There is some evidence suggesting that the inspectors were given general instructions to be "reasonable" and to avoid confrontations with employers. For example, in 1895 Inspector Barber noted that the inspectors
"understand it to be the wish of the Government that the Factories' Act shall
be enforced in an efficient manner, with as little friction and annoyance as
possible."65 A further indication of the government's negative attitude
"See Bartrip & Fenn, "A Re-assessment," 182 for the assertion that the level of resources
devoted to enforcement was a decision of an undifferentiated community. See Carson, "Early
Factory Inspectors and the Viable Class Society - A Rejoinder," International Journal for the
Sociology of Law, 8 (1980) 187, 190 for a critique of Bartrip & Fenn's usage of the notion of
community in the context of nineteenth century Great Britain.
"'inspectors of Factories, 1890, 22 1nd d896, 6,.
61
Inspectors of Factories, 1898, 9.
"inspectors of Factories, 1890, 21. 1nspector Broww acknowledged dih error and dromised to
prosecute every case in the future.
"Ibid.
M
ln the inspectors' correspondence from 1898-1900, I found only one letter in which permission to proscecute was sought. James R. Brown to John Dryden, Minister of Agriculture, 27
Sept. 1898.
"inspectors of Factories, 189S, 1.
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toward prosecuting employers arose from a meeting in 1897 between the Executive Committee for Ontario of the TLCC and the Minister of Agriculture to discuss the enforcement of the Factory laws.66 The Committee
brought to the Minister's attention complaints being made by the Hamilton
TLC, amongst others, that "the Government will not allow the inspectors
to enforce the Act" and urged him to be more energetic. The Minister is
reported to have replied that "he was heartily in sympathy with the cause
of labour, and that it was not the Government's object to secure convictions
and fines as it was to cause a due observance of the laws by quiet means."67
In sum, it is difficult to state conclusively the extent of direct Government control over the decision-making of the inspectorate. To the extent that
the inspectors faced political or administrative obstacles to prosecution, it
was rational for them to resort to an alternate strategy. However, to simply
explain the choice of enforcement strategy on the grounds of efficiency or
rationality obscures the central importance of class politics in shaping the
formation of implementation policy.
Another reason given for the decision not to pursue a more prosecutorial strategy was that the inspectors met with judicial hostility when they attempted to do so. Although frequent complaints of this nature were made
by inspectors in other jurisdictions, no such allegations were made by the
Ontario inspectors during this period. As well, although the labour movement consistently complained about many aspects of the implementation of
the Act, I have only discovered a single instance in which the judiciary was
criticised for being "exacting" and "almost always against the interests of
the working people immediately concerned" in their application of both the
Factories Act and the Workmen's Compensatton For Injuries Act.** *he
lack of judicial hostility to the inspectors can also be inferred from the results
of the cases they brought. Convictions were obtained in 20 out of the 35
charges laid. In nine cases the court gave the defendants time to comply with
the inspectors orders, and in one of those, a conviction was later obtained
when the defendant failed to do so. There were only three outright acquittals. Although the fines were generally quite low, they were usually in line

T"he factory inspectors were placed under the authority of the Minister of Agriculture in 1889.
TLCC, Proceedings (1897), II.
This was contained in a report of the Legislative Committee of the TTLC. See Labour Advocate, 10 July 1891.
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with the amounts suggested by the inspectors, and certainly did not arouse
their ire.69
Another external factor offered as an explanation of why it was rational
for inspectors not to prosecute is that the legislation itself created procedural
or substantive hurdles which made prosecutions difficult to conduct successfully. One such difficulty was the requirement in section 38 of the Act that
an information had to be laid within two or three months of the occurrence
of the violation, depending on the penalty. The non-reporting of serious accidents frequently resulted in the inspectors discovering the accident only after
the period had elapsed, and was offered as a reason for not prosecuting.70
This explanation is not convincing because, even after section 38 was amended
in 1895 to eliminate the possibility that immunity could be acquired by nonreporting,7' there was no increase in prosecutions.
A second possible difficulty with the Act was that the standards that employers had to satisfy were prescribed in open-ended language. For example, there was no definition of overcrowding (s. 11(2)). Factories had to be
ventilated "so far as is reasonably practicable" (s. 11(3)), and moving parts
of machinery had to be "as far as practicable, securely guarded" (s. 15(1)).
Initially it was contemplated that regulations defining these requirements
would be promulgated, but by 1889 it was recognized that enforcement would
have to proceed in their absence, and the Act was amended accordingly.72
The absence of objective standards could have made it more difficult to establish that the Act had been breached. It is by no means clear, however,
that this proved to be a problem in the few charges laid pursuant to sections
worded in these ways that were brought under section 14. For example, in
the one case brought under the general duty requirement, a conviction was
obtained at first instance, although it was subsequently quashed on unrelated grounds.7' As well, in another case, a conviction was obtained for inadeFor discussions of difficulties inspectors experienced with the courts in other jurisdictions see,
C. Walker, A History of Factory Legislation ana Inspector in New York State, 1886-1911 (Ph.1(
thesis, Columbia University, 1969), 221-8; Bartrip and Fenn, "The Administration of Safety:
The Enforcement Policy of the Early Inspectorate, 1844-1864," Public Administration, 58
(1980),87. In two cases the result could not be ascertained. With respect to the question of fines,
the highest fine recorded was $25.00 for employing a boy under the age of 12 who lost two
fingers in machine gearing. (Inspectors of Factories, 1890, 32). This was excextional. Most fines
were less than $5.00.
Indeed, in one case a prosecution was dismissed because the information was out of time.
This led the inspector to call for an amendment to the Act. Inspector of Factories, ,891, 1,-5.
1,
The Ontario Factories Amendment Actt 1895, S.O. .895 5. 50, s.lll
7:
For example, in the original Act, section 12 gave the inspectors the authority to issue remedial
orders for violations of the provisions regarding sanitation, ventilation and overcrowding, pursuant to regulations made in relation to those subjects. The Ontario Factories' Amendment
Act, 1889, s.7, amended that sectton by adding the words "if any" thereby empowering the
inspectors to act in the absence of regulations.
"/?. v. Weir, (1899), 20 C.L.T. 232.
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quate ventilation notwithstanding that section 11(3) only required factories
to be ventilated "so far as is reasonably practicable."
A third possible weakness of the Act was that it failed to deal with some
of the more significant hazards in the workplace. For example, the Act did
not contain specific requirements for the operation of boilers and, although
legislation to remedy this defect was regularly introduced, it was vigorously
and successfully opposed by employers. However, it is not clear how great
an obstacle this posed to the inspectors. They were specifically authorized
by the Attorney-General to rely on the general duties section when dealing
with matters not falling under more specific clauses, and were successful in
the one case they prosecuted under this section." As well, the Act was
reasonably comprehensive and, with the exception of boiler regulation, when
problems in the Act were identified, the legislature frequently remedied them.
In sum, inasmuch as some prosecutions were not undertaken because of
the external constraints on the inspectors, this does not explain why prosecution was resorted to so infrequently. The explanation is more complex and
is hinted at by the following incident. In Hamilton v. Groesbeck, an employers' liability case, the court was called upon to interpret section 15 of
Ontario's Factories' Act which imposed an obligation on employers to guard
the moving parts of a machine." The court construed the section narrowly. It its view, it only applied to transitive parts of a machine, not its working parts. In effect, this meant that saw blades did not need to be guarded,
only the parts that supplied power to them. On its face, the case suggested
that poor legislative drafting combined with judicial hostility would have deterred the inspectors from attempting prosecutions. However a closer examination of the surrounding circumstances undermines that conclusion. First,
section 15(1) was subsequently amended by the legislature to overcome this
restrictive interpretation.76 Second, this case was exceptional. There was no
pattern of restrictive judicial interpretations of factory or employer liability
legislation." Finally, Inspector Barber favourably commented on the lower court's ruling in his annual report. He treated the decision as a vindication of his own views on the scope of the section, although he claimed that
he had advised employers to guard these parts in the past even though they
were not legally obliged to do so.78 The fact that he publicly expressed his
agreement with the court's interpretation is surprising, because the Government had joined the plaintiff's appeal in support of a broader interpretation
74

See, Inspectors o/Factories, 18900,2.
"Hamilton v. Groesbeck ((891), 18 O.A.R. 437 aff'g. 19 O.R. 76. For a discussion of the
relevance of the Factory Act to an employer liability action see, Tucker, "Employers' Liability," 245-6.
16
The Factories smendment Act, ,895, S.S.O.95 c. 505 ss. 3.6.
"Tucker, "Employers' Liability," 241-44.
78
Inspectors so Factories, 1890, 11-2.
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of the Act. More importantly, Barber's comments suggest that his narrow
interpretation of the legislation was at least as significant in explaining his
behaviour as any constraint externally imposed by the courts, by unfortunate
legislative drafting or even by government policy. Certainly this was the
TTLC's interpretation of this incident at the time. They referred to Barber's
comments on the case in his Report as evidence of his lack of sympathy with
the objectives of the law, and emphasized that his views were inconsistent
with those of the Government.™
In sum, scarce resources were the most substantial external constraint
on the inspectors' choice of enforcement strategy. Successful prosecutions
require the commitment of resources. Violations had to be detected, evidence
collected and given, and counsel instructed. In the face of limited resources,
a strategy of enforcement that relied primarily on prosecutions would not
have been feasible. Nevertheless, efficiency considerations did not dictate
a strategy which virtually abandoned prosectution as a tool of enforcement.
Inspectors might have responded differently to the problem of scarce
resources in order to maintain a more vigourous prosecutorial component
to the enforcement program.
First of all, the Act contained numerous provisions that would have facilitated prosecutions if the inspectors had chosen to initiate them. The inspectors were given substantial powers of investigation and examination by section
25 of the Act. Section 3 provided that a person found on factory premises
was deemed to be an employee until the contrary was proved. Further, in
1889, the Act was amended to make a person charged under it a competent
and compellable witness.80
One way of reducing the costs of detection would have been to develop
a network of informers. This was only attempted on a limited scale. Arrangements were made for trade unions to funnel the complaints of their members to the inspectors and, in fact, complaints were received by the inspectors
in this manner.81 As well, the inspectors received complaints directly from
See, The Labour Advocate, 12 June loy1.
The Ontario Factories' Amendment Act, 1889, S.O. 1889, c. 42, s.12.
For example, as a result of complaints by the Hamilton Trades and Labour Council that Barber was not enforcing the Act, a meeting between Barber, accompanied by Brown, and representatives of the Hamilton TLC was held at which arrangements were made for the Hamilton TLC
to act as the medium of communication between workers and the inspector. See, The Labour
Advocate, 20ct. 1891. Reference to similar arrangements are to be found in the evidence taken
by the Commission on the Sweating System in Canada, 30. As well, the inspectors' correspondence for the years 1898-1900 contains letters from trade unions and councils referring the inspectors to specific matters that had been brought to their attention. Correspondence from these
years was fortuitously saved by virtue of the act that in 1901 the Legislative Assembly ordered
a return of all correspondence and papers having refrence to the enforcement of the Act. See
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Session Paper 79, (unpublished, 1901), on file at the Public Archives of Ontario, R.G.49, Series I-7-B-2. (Hereinafter referred to as Inspectors' Correspondence).
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employees and other interested persons.12 There were, however, significant
limitations on this source of information. Although these communications
were received in confidence by the inspectors, employees remained fearful
of employer retaliation.*1 Thus, it was not surprising that when inspectors
received direct complaints, they were sent anonymously under names such
as "One Who Knows," "A.Victim," "A Sufferer," or "An Upholder of
Decency."*4 It does not seem, however, that the inspectors actively cultivated a network of informants." Further, although they frequently claimed to
speak with employees during their inspections, the fact that they were commonly accompanied by the owner or a superintendent made communication
of complaints a risky undertaking for the employee.*6 Perhaps, it can be argued that because intimidation made it difficult to rely on informers, it was
rational not to adopt a strategy that depended on them. However, such a
characterization obscures the class basis of the constraints on the rational.
The inequality of power between capital and labour manifested itself in relationships of domination that were enforced by intimidation and exclusion.
As Inspector Brown noted in commenting on employer threats: "[P]ity it
is that one human being should have the power to determine as to whether
another should be permitted to obtain a living or not."87

Section 29(2) of the Act provided for the posting of the name and address of the inspector
at the entrance to the factory, or at such other locations as the inspector directed. However,
section 21 exempted factories not employing women and children, as well as some private dwellings, from this requirement. At the behest of the inspectors this exemption was eliminated in
1889. See, The Ontario Factories' Amendment Act, 1889, S.O. 1889, c. 43, s. 8 and Report
of Inspectors, 1889, 6. The names of factory inspectors were also published in Labour Day
Souvenirs published by local Trades and Labour Councils. For example see Allied Trades and
Labour Association, Labour Day Souvenir, 1898, (Ottawa).
For example, Brown noted that he had encountered employers, "who when they hear of complaints being made, do not scruple to express the threat that if they only knew the parties who
complained they would be discharged at once." He then commented, "It is not to be wondered
at, therefore, that parties having complaints to make should seek to do so through other parties, rather than run the risk of losing their employment." See, Inspectors of Factories, 1890,
21. Similar fears were articulated in the evidence before the Commission on the Sweating System in Canada, 30-3.
The policy of maintaining confidentiality was referred to by Inspector Rocque in Inspectors
of Factories, 1888, 28. Rocque also reported that he received no complaints in his first year.
Rather than attributing this to fear, he saw it as a sign "that good feeling seemed to exist between the employers and employees."
Inspectors Correspondence.
The only reference to the use of such a strategy comes from Inspector Rocque who, feeling
frustrated by the difficulty of securing evidence regarding child labour, noted that he had secured the assistance of people in various localities in collecting such information. See, Inspectors of Factories 1899, 17.
See for example, Inspectors of Factories, 1888, 5-6. The practice of inspectors being accompanied by foremen or proprietors was one of the matters raised by the Hamilton TLC in their
meetings with Barber in 1891. See The Labour Advocate, 2 Oct. 1891.
Inspectors of Factories, 1890, 21.
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The Act also contained provisions which aimed to reduce the cost of enforcement. Employers were required to maintain various registers, and to
give the inspectors notice that they had occupied a factory and that a serious
injury had occurred on the premises.88 The maintenance of registers of child
and female employees and of hours of overtime presumably were intended
to make it easier for the inspectors to monitor compliance. Notice of occupation of factories was designed to assist the inspectors in keeping up with
changes within their districts, as well as alerting them as to the degree of
mechanization in new factories. However, the effectiveness of these devices
in reducing the amount of time an inspector would have to spend either to
monitor compliance or to locate new factories largely depended on the willingness of employers to comply voluntarily. The fact that failure to comply
could result in a prosecution under the Act did not, in itself, pose a serious
incentive to comply, since the enforcement of these obligations required the
expenditure of the same scarce resources that the provision was designed to
conserve. Not surprisingly, inspectors experienced some difficulty with the
implementation of these recordirtg and notice provisions."
Accident reporting caused inspectors the most problems. Accident reporting can serve a variety of functions in factory regulation. On the one hand,
it can provide a data base which can be used to identify widespread hazards,
evaluate their seriousness and educate employers about preventative measures they can take. If used in this way, accident reporting is non-threatening.
The information obtained is not used as the basis for taking some action
aimed directly and exclusively at the reporting employer. On the other hand,
accident reporting can be used as a means of detecting violations that resulted in death or serious injury. These violations might be considered particularly suitable for prosecution, or for a remedial order. If used in such a
manner, employers would obviously be less inclined to comply voluntarily
with the accident reporting requirements.
There can be no doubt that employers initially resisted the accident reporting requirements. For example, in the first year of inspection, only five of
the 50 accidents Barber discovered were reported.90 This could be partly explained by the novelty of the requirement and its limited scope." However,
it could also be explained by the fact that employers initially feared that additional inspections, possible prosecution and an increase in the likelihood
"'The Ontario Factories' Act, 1884, ss. 9, 18, 19, 28 and 29.
"For example, Barber reported in 1900 that since 1887 he received only 12 notices of occupancy. He discovered new factories by consulting business directories and newspapers. See Inspectors of Factories, 1900, II.
'"inspectors of Factories, ,888, 1.
'Sections 18 and 19 only required the employer to report terrous accidents requiring the worker to be off work for six days which were caused by fire or other specifically mentioned causes.
As well, s. 21 created exemptions from the reporting requirement.
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of successful employer liability actions by their employees would result from
reporting.92
The inspectorate tried to achieve better compliance with the reporting
requirements in a variety of ways. First, they sought to have the legislation
amended to rationalize the requirement and eliminate any confusion that
might have existed. Thus in 1889 the Act was amended to limit the scope
of the section 21 exemption with respect to factories not employing women
and children," and in 1895 the Act was further amended to require that all
serious accidents, however caused, be reported.** Inspectors also assured
employers that adverse consequences would not follow from reporting. The
preventative purpose of reporting was emphasized by the inspectors, as was
the separation between factory regulation and employers' liability litigation." While these measures seem to have improved the regularity of reporting, " inspectors continued to discover unreported accidents through other
sources. This led to the adoption of a third strategy, the threat of prosecution for non-reporting.97 This was a weak threat. If the inspector was late
in discovering the non-reporting, prosecution would be precluded because
of the expiry of the period for laying informations.9* Moreover, in the one
instance in which a prosecution for non-reporting was commenced, it failed

With regard to the avoidance of prosecutions, non-reporting might result in the accident never
coming to the attention of the inspector, or if it did, it might only come after the two or three
month limitation period for laying informations had expired. ( s. 38(1)). In employer liability
suits, a finding that the injury had been caused by a violation of the Factory Act usually resulted in strict liability. See Tucker, "Employers' Liability," 245-6. Inspectors could be called as
witnesses in such actions until 1905 when they were given immunity. See The Statute Law Amendment Act, 1905, S.O. 1905, c. 13, s. 30.
n
The Ontario Factories' Amendment Act, 1889, s. 8.
""The Faccories' Amendment Act 18955,s 7.
As noted earlier, there were practically no prosecutions arising out of occupationally related
deaths or serious injuries. Thus, when Barber explained that the purpose of reporting was to
lessen the incidence of accidents (Inspectors of Factories, 1899, 7) employers understood that
this did not entail the imposition of sanctions. With respect to employers' liability, Barber reported
that he frequently told employers that reporting of accidents had nothing to do with the institution of legal action for damages by employees. (Inspectors of Factories, 1892, 6.) Further reassurance that this separation would be maintained was provided in 1905 when the Act was amended
to allow inspectors to refuse to testify with respect to matters arising out of their inspections.
"indeed, the inspectors frequently attributed increases in the number of reported accidents in
their districts to better reporting. For example, see Inspectors of Factories, 1890, 7.
''Failure to report was punishable by a fine of up to $30.00. Ontario Factories' Act, ss. 18,19.
For instances in which prosecutions were threatened see Inspection of Factories, 1892, 26 and
Inspection of Factories 1898 6 18.
Inspection of Factories, 1893, 13.
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because the injured employee and attending physician testified that she could
have returned to work within six days."
In sum, the inspectors could have invested more effort in pursuing strategies designed to maintain a stronger prosecution component to their enforcement program. They chose not to do so. In part, this may be explained as
a rational choice made in the face of external constraints, some of which
directly reflected the reality of unequal class power. As well, the decision
reflected a set of beliefs and assumptions about the causes of unsafe and
unhealthy work conditions and the way these could be reduced or eliminated. On the whole, the inspectors believed that education was the best way
to achieve compliance. The elements of this worldview need to be reconstructed in order to appreciate their impact on the choice of enforcement strategy.
The inspectors' worldviews included assumptions about the causes of accidents, the social responsibility of employers, the compatibility of labour
and capital's interests in occupational health and safety and the special vulnerability of women and children. These assumptions were a critical determinant of the behaviour of the inspectors. Indeed, even if we accepted that
the inspectors were motivated solely by their desire to use their scarce resources
efficiently, their efficiency calculus was significantly influenced by their outlooks. The salience of ideology in explaining the choice of enforcement strategy is manifested most clearly in the differences that emerged between
inspectors Brown and Barber.100
The first component of the inspectors' worldviews was their assumptions
about accident causation. Barber did not believe that most accidents and injuries were caused by violations of the Act, or by unsafe conditions. In Barber's view, accidents were primarily caused by worker carelessness. For
example, in his first report, Inspector Barber cited Mr. Whymper, Superintending Inspector for the Southern Counties of England.
Factory Acts and Inspectors may, should, and, as I now contend, do help to save life and
limbs by their efforts to call attention to, and protect dangerous gearing; but they cannot, although
indeed they are often credited with the power to do all sorts of things, eradicate people's love
for amusement, their inattention, their recklessness.

Barber then noted, "Most accidents are traceable to one or the other of these
causes."102 In a similar vein, Inspector Rocque stated, "I have found belt-

Employer intimidation seems likely. The employee had part of two fingers cut off and a third
injured. The inspector visited her eight days after the accident and was told that she was still
in pain and unable to work. Inspectors of Factories, 1893, 20.
inspector Rocque seems to have shared Barber's worldview, but because he was assigned the
less industrialized eastern district his activities did not attract as much attention as Barber's.
Cited in Inspectors of Factories, 1888, 7.

MAKING THE WORKPLACE 'SAFE' 71
ing, shafting, gearing and moving machinery in all factories in my district,
fairly well fenced in and guarded; and I consider that very few accidents would
occur, if workmen would exercise more prudence while using or working
around machinery in motion."103 To the extent that Barber recognized a
connection between the labour process and the accident rate, he still tended
to blame the worker, or consider the accident unpreventable, presumably
on the basis that monotonous or intense work were conditions that workers
had to adapt to and not conditions that inspectors should be condemning.'04
Inspector Brown differed from his colleagues in this regard. He attributed accidents to non-compliance with the Act, and recognized that the employment of young and untrained people, lengthy hours of work on dangerous
machinery, piece-rate payment schemes and speeding-up production were frequently the underlying causes of what appeared to others as worker carelessness.105 As well, he recognized that accident reports from employers
which routinely blamed worker carelessness or disobedience were untrustworthy.I06 Although Brown may have felt he could not change these conditions, he was prepared to condemn them as the "butcher bill" of increased
productive power.107
Barber's belief that violations of the Act were not a major cause of occupational deaths and injuries contributed to, and strengthened a second belief: that the overwhelming majority of employers were willing to cooperate
with the inspector in eliminating violations or hazards that were pointed out
to them. He and Rocque continuously repeated the observation that they
were cordially received by employers who expressed a desire to conform to
the Act and who took a real interest in the welfare of their employees.108
Regret was expressed when employers resisted recommendations that involved
substantial expense, but this did not detract from the overall positive perception of employer cooperation.00* Employers who exhibited this positive
attitude merited understanding from the inspectors. They were not to be treated as potential offenders who had to be carefully monitored in order to detect deviant behaviour, but rather were to be educated and assisted in their
w,
Ibid., 29.
""inspectors so Factories, 1897, 8-98
""inspectors of Factories, ,890, 08 (young geople); Inspectors of Factories, 18918 14 (noncompliance); Inspectors of Factories, 1892, 14 1long hours); Inspectors of Factories, 1888, 28
(piece-work) and Inspectors of Factories, ,899, 15 (speed-ups).
""'Inspectors of Factories, 1895, 15.
'"'Inspectors of Factories, 1899, 161
l08
For example, see, Inspectors of Factories, ,889, 8.
""For example, Inspector Barber notes in his report for 1891 that "I have been in all cases cordially received by employers, who, with very rare exceptions, show every disposition to conform to the requirements of the Factories' Act, so long as no great outtay of money is involved
in making the changes necessary to accomplish that object." Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 5.
This observation does not detract from the positive tone of the report.
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efforts to conform to the law."0 Given this view of the social responsibility of employers,'" it made perfect sense to regard one of the primary functions of the inspector as an educator who provided information to employers
on safety technology and plant design."2 Increasingly, the inspectors'
reports came to be filled with information and advice of this nature.
Of course, not all employers fell into the category of the socially responsible. The inspectors also reported the existence of a small minority of employers who regarded the Act and the inspectors as an unwarranted intrusion
into their private affairs. Fortunately, this minority was seen to be decreasing in size as the inspectors succeeded in educating them and gaining their
confidence by demonstrating their reasonableness. Inspector Rocque
described this approach aptly:
When the Act came in operation the employers mistrusted the Inspectors, and were so
prejudiced against them and the Act that they considered it as an interference with their business and liberty as citizens; but by using much discretion and enforcing the provisions of the
Act gradually and in such cases only which seemed, at the time, reasonable to the employer
the Inspectors have succeeded in divesting him of all prejudices; and in my district I must say
thai I have now reached a point where I can secure the co-operation of mostly all employers
and many overseers, not only in the carrying out of all suggestions made in accordance with
the Act, but also any propositions to better the conditions of the employees.1"

In a world in which employers are cooperative, or can be easily won over,
a persuasive strategy of enforcement is eminently reasonable. Prosecutorial
activity would only serve to destroy the trust upon which the cooperative
relationship is built. It was on the basis of these perceptions that the inspectors came to see prosecution as an option to be resorted to only in exceptional cases. This approach to prosecution was most clearly articulated by
Inspector Barber:
Though I have during the year met with many cases where some slight violations of the
Act have occurred, through not attending to some of its provisions, still I have not met with
See, Inspectors of Factories, 1889, 7, where Inspector Barber recites the following speech
of Mr. Whymper, H. M. Superintending Inspector of Factories and Workshops, with approval.
[BJy some to carry out the Factory Act is thought to mean that every place should be
visited at short regular intervals, without reference to the expediency of the visit, and
that every district should be, as it were, patrolled by Inspectors; that, in a word, no single irregularity, however rare or isolated, should take place without approximate certainty of detection and punishment. In the eyes of others, to carry out the Act means
to prevent these rare irregularities being multiplied to an extent which would involve hardship or injury to the protected persons, and it is this meaning which I, for one, accept.
"'Hawkins' found that pollution enforcement officers in modern England also made the assumption that most dischargers were socially responsible. See Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement (Oxford 1984) 110.
For a similar view of how factory inspectors defined their role see Jones, "An Inspector
Calls: Health and Safety at Work in Inter-War Britain," in Weindling, éd.. The Social History
of Occupational Health (London, 1985), 223.
Inspectors of Factories, 1898, 23.
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any such that I considered as intentional, but rather an oversight. I might more particularly
refer to the non-reporting of accidents, and occasionally employing a child without first procuring
a certificate of age. I have not thought it necessary to lay these matters before you and recommend prosecutions, believing that in time as employers become more familiar with all the provisions of the Act, the inspector will have very little to complain of. Prosecutions, I consider,
should be resorted to only when violations seem wilful, or through indifference, and where other
means fail to have the law observed."4

The belief that most accidents were either unavoidable or the result of
worker carelessness, and that most employers were good citizens who were
prepared to cooperate with the inspectors meshed with, and reinforced a third
component of the inspectors' worldview: that health and safety in the workplace was not an issue on which there was, or ought to be, conflict between
employers and workers. Factory regulation was seen to be mutually beneficial to employers and employees alike. Of course, the inspectors realized that
this view was not self-evidently true, particularly to employers, and that one
of their tasks was to convert the non-believers. We have already seen that
the inspectors undertook to demonstrate to employers that they would be
reasonable in exercising their discretionary powers under the Act. One aspect
of that reasonableness was the willingness of the inspectors to be sensitive
to the general economic climate. For example, during the recession/depression of the early 1890s Inspector Barber noted, "In making my inspections
I do not overlook the unsatisfactory state of trade in many industries, and
in some cases have passed by some alterations required that I would not have
done had trade been more prosperous, as regards these factories.""5 Indeed, even in good times, the cost of remedial action, such as the introduction of fans, was taken into account by the inspectors in exercising their
discretion as to what constituted compliance with the Act."6
Of course, the inspectors were not always willing to defer to employer
arguments about costs. Indeed, inspectors frequently argued that compliance was in the economic self-interest of employers because the long term
economic benefits flowing from compliance outweighed its immediate costs.
For example, in his report for 1890, Inspector Barber provided a general
defence of factory legislation which concluded with a quote from the English Royal Commission of 1875 on the impact of regulation.
We have no reason to believe that the legislation which has been productive of such marked
Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 9-10.
Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 5. A similar sensitivity to the economic conditions was expressed by Margaret Carlyle in 1897. "Though actuated with a desire to enforce all laws by
which we are governed for the benefit and protection of the labouring classes, yet, in view of
the depressed condition of business of all kinds in the first part of the year, it was necessary
to be very careful not to make demands that were not absolutely necessary." Inspectors of Factories, 1897, 18.
"''Inspectors of Factories, 1894, 9.
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benefit to the operatives employed, has caused any serious loss to the industries to which it
has been applied. On the contrary, the progress of manufacture has apparently been entirely
unimpeded by the Factory Acts; and there are but few, even among employers, who would now
wish to repeal the main provisions of the Acts, or would deny the benefit which has resulted
from them."7

The gospel that "safety pays" was preached by the inspectors. Improved
conditions and a working day that did not exceed the legal limits would increase worker productivity and firm profitability. As well, employers were
told of the general benefit of having a satisfied workforce, and that the Act
would relieve competitive pressure generated by employers who "are not
abreast of the times..""
The inspectors also believed that there was no fundamental conflict of
interest between workers and their employers over health and safety. Indeed,
they believed that the industrial system operated to the mutual benefit of
employers and employees in all areas. As such, it was expected that in normal times employees would be as willing to be reasonable in their demands
as were the inspectors, since their interests were not fundamentally different
from those of their employers. Therefore, when employees complained about
violations of the Act or the failure of the inspector to intervene on their behalf, the difficulty was frequently attributed to labour unrest having nothing to do with health and safety.
The best example of this attitude arose out of a controversy in Brantford
over a demand for ventilation fans. On 13 June, 1898, Mr. F. Mather, Secretary of the Brantford Trades and Labour Council, wrote to the AttorneyGeneral complaining that, despite several complaints to the inspector, no
action had been taken to require the installation of fans in a number of factories in the town. The matter was referred to the Minister of Agriculture
who forwarded the complaint to Inspector Barber. On 16 June 1898 Barber
wrote to the Minister explaining the problem as one in which "there is an
animus against the Company because they do not recognize the Union and
the Union wants to cause them annoyance and to get my help." No action
was taken. A further complaint was sent to the Minister on 19 October, 1899.
After further investigation the Minister responded on 10 November, stating
that, "I do not think it advisable to unduly press the matter at the present
time, as I have no doubt the firm will duly comply with the requirements
of the Act as soon as they can do so without serious injury to business."

'"Inspectors of Factories, ,890, 0,1
"^Inspectors of Factories, ,892, 5.
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Upon further complaint, the Minister finally ordered Inspector Barber to
take action on 9 March 1900.'"
Just as Inspector Brown disagreed with his colleagues over the cause of
accidents, so too he disagreed with them over the other components of their
world view. Although he advised employers in his first report that, "I have
endeavoured, in enforcing the Act, to put a liberal construction upon its requirements, not asking to take undue advantage of any non-conformity not
in wilful violation of the Act," and noted the willingness of most employers
to comply, he also recognized that employers and employees did not necessarily share a common interest. This was not seen to be just a function of
some ill informed employers who "appear to be indifferent to their
[employees'] welfare," but rather the result of an industrial system in which
"production and distribution are carried on primarily with a view to make
money for individuals and firms of an employing class, and without regard
to the interests of the workers engaged in production and distribution...."120
The fourth component of the inspectors' world views was their attitude
toward women and children. In this regard, there were no significant differences between Barber and Brown, or for that matter, between Carlyle and
her male colleagues. All were equally vociferous in their denunciations of
the evils of child labour, although Brown was somewhat more sensitive to
the harsh economic realities that sometimes led working class parents to send
their children into the factory.121 They also all claimed that the laws in this
regard were vigorously enforced.122
With regard to female labour, the male inspectors generally reported on
their enforcement of provisions designed to protect female labour with little

bee, Inspectors Correspondence. In commenting on these events in his annual report Inspector Barber noted, "I wish to do justice to the workers and the employers, and sometimes I
reach a deadlock
When there is a good understanding between the polishers' union and the
employer there are few complaints, but it is quite different when all is not harmonious. All
complaints with respect to ventilation and dust have been investigated, and the cause of complaint has been, or is being removed as far as possible in most cases." Inspectors of Factories,
1899, 3-4.
Inspectors of Factories, 1893, 15.
Inspectors of Factories, 1898, 15.
An equal number of parents and employers were prosecuted for violations of the child labour
laws. The following comment of Inspector Carlyle is typical.
The welfare of the child cannot be sacrificed to the short-sighted demands of parents,
who, for their own apparent benefit, would doom their children to a life of toil and ignorance. My view of the duty, as it regards the enforcement of this, or any other law,
is, that while good judgment and discretion ought always to be employed, the whole
fabric of legal protection to child labour could be undermined if the enforcement of these
laws were left to discretion of the Inspector.
See Inspectors of Factories, 1899, 22.
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or no commentary.123 There were some expressions of special concern arising from a perceived female disposition to panic in emergencies,124 but on
the whole, the rhetoric of the male inspectors was milder than that of many
of the reformers who had called for legislation in the first place. The entry
of women in fields that had previously been exclusively male was noted with
some mild reservation, but certainly no great alarm.125
Of course, much of the male inspectors' responsibility for the enforcement of provisions relating exclusively to women was alleviated by the appointment of Margaret Carlyle in 1895 as Female Inspector of Factories.126
Pursuant to the Order-in-Council appointing her, except as regards to provisions relating to machine fencing and fire safety, she was given complete
jurisdiction over factories employing female labour only, and shared jurisdiction over matters relating to the employment of women and children in
mixed settings.127 Not surprisingly, she was paid half as much as the male
inspectors.128 The appointment of a female inspector was widely supported
on the grounds that it would facilitate the enforcement of those provisions
designed principally for the protection of female employees.I2'
Inspector Rocque reflected the prevailing wisdom when he reported, The Act is also calculated to protect society in providing such regulations as would guard the morals where so
many persons of different sexes are employed in the same workrooms...." (.Inspectors of Factories, 1893, 17).
l24
See Inspectors of Factories, 1895, 8 (Barber).
'"inspector Barber noted that he could not, in his own mind, accept all the justifications
offered for having women perform work which ten or fifteen years ago had been considered
proper for men only (Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 7). Inspector Brown, in tht course of condemning the sweating system in the clothing trades, noted that wives and daughters of workmen who take out work from clothing houses "to eke out the wages of a husband, or father,
or it may be to get a little 'pin money' " drive down the wages of those who depend on their
jobs for a living, (Inspectors of Factories, ,893935)5 Broww nlso expressed discomfort tith
having to deal with "female employers who are of a masculine turn." (Inspectors of Factories,
1891, 15))
Carlyle had been employed in manufacturing establishments in Glasgow prior to emigrating to Canada. Prior to her appointment she was in business for herself in Toronto. As well,
she was an active suffragist. See Bacchi, Liberation Deferred? (Toronto o983) )9, 44 1nd Morgan, éd., The Canadian Men and Women of The Time, 2nd éd.. (Toronto 1912), 200.
'"Public Archives of Ontario, R.G.3, O.C. 32/360, Order-in-Council, 5 July, 1895.
l28
Even after nearly twenty years' service, Carlyle was paid less than the most junior male factory inspector. See Ontario. Public Accounts, Sessional Paper I, (Toronto 1913-14). Carlyle
advocated equalizing the wages of men and women as a solution to the downward pressure
on wages that resulted whenever women began to perform work previously done exclusively
by men. See Inspectors of Factories, 1898, 31 Obviously, she die not achieve this goag for herself.
l29
As one commentator noted at the time "There must be women inspectors where there are
women employees The greatest trials and hardships of a factory women's life can be told only
to one of her own sex " Annie MacLean "Factory Legislation for Women in Canada " American
Journal of Sociology 5(1899) 172 180 Both Barber and Brown commented on the fact that
Carlvle had received complaints that otherwise would not have surfaced Inspectors of Factories 1895 9 13
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Given her mandate it is not surprising that Carlyle focused on matters
such as hours of work, ventilation and sanitation, including the provision
of separate lavatories for men and women. However, her general world view
was more consistent with Barber's than Brown's, including her view that
workers were frequently responsible for their own misfortune.130 With
respect to women, she vigorously defended the appropriateness of their entry into the public sphere of industrial production. She defended the honourable position of "factory girls'"" and promoted conditions conducive to its
protection. For example, she recommended that young girls be supervised
by women overseers,"2 and upbraided foremen for using abusive language.'" In general, her worldview seems very much in line with the
"maternal feminism" of other middle class reformers of the period.'54
What impact, if any, did these values and assumptions have on the enforcement of the inspectors? The most striking pattern is that 29 of the 35
charges prosecuted related to the protection of child and female labour. On
its face this suggests that when it came to enforcing these provisions, the
inspectors' belief in the special vulnerability of women and children, and the
immorality of exploiting that vulnerability, significantly influenced their will"°For example, Carlyle claimed that poor sanitary conditions were mostly the fault of the operatives themselves.
Employees often mis-use the best provisions made for their comfort and welfare. They
destroy ruthlessly the most expensive plumbing, and litter and soil rooms uselessly. On
the other hand there are places where women of refined habits, and high sense of order,
carry those qualities into their working surroundings.
Inspectors of Factories, ,8989 282
A very large percentage of our factory girls are beautiful types of Christian devotion
and fine womanly feeling. I am sure you will find as large a number of generous selfsacrificing sisters and daughters among mill help as among any other class in the world.
There is honor in every right walk of industry, whether it is weaving fabrics or selling
the product from the counter.
Inspectors of Factories, ,896, 242
"'Inspectors of Factories, ,899, 262
'"inspectors of Factories, 1900, 212 ("I fail to understand dow anyone calling himself a man
could be guilty of such conduct.")
l34

See Linda Kealey éd., A Not Unreasonable Claim (Toronto 1979), ,nd dspecially Waane
Roberts, " 'Rocking the Cradle for the World': The New Woman and Maternal Feminism,
Toronto, 1877-1914," Ibid., 15. A classic example of the rhetoric of maternal feminism can
be found in the speech of Cora Stuchfield, a woman factory inspector from Pennsylvania, given
before the tenth annual convention of International Association of Factory Inspectors held in
Toronto in 1896, and attended by Carlyle.
In every woman's soul is a desire to benefit her fellow-beings, and she does it whenever
a chance is afforded her. This great quality of heart has been a mighty factor in our
civilization, and where could woman find a more unlimited or better field to aid in uplifting and reducing the sufferings of toilers in the factories?
A true woman carries with her an atmosphere which makes itself felt....
International Association of Factory Inspectors, Convention Proceedings ((196), 75-6.
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ingness to stigmatize violators by prosecuting them. The time for negotiated
compliance to take place was reduced. However, equally striking is the fact
that 27 out of these 29 charges were initiated by Brown. This suggests that
even though the inspectors agreed on the need for special protection, only
Brown saw prosecution as an appropriate means of providing it, despite the
fact that he faced the same external constraints as they did. This difference
can perhaps best be explained on the basis of his understanding of the motivation of employers and the limits of persuasion as an enforcement strategy. Further, it suggests that instrumental rationality is not a sufficient
explanation of enforcement behaviour. Rationality cannot be divorced from
the assumptions and values brought to bear in evaluating the problem to be
resolved.
D. Constructing the Meaning of Compliance
Beyond the question of the choice of enforcement strategy lies the question of what significance, if any, did the differences between Brown and Barber have on the levels of risk to which workers were exposed. Were the workers
in Brown's district any better off than were the workers in Barber's district?
The accidental injury and death data that we have for this period is probably too crude to allow meaningful comparisons to be made and I have not
attempted to do so.'"
Another way of trying to assess the impact of enforcement strategies is
by comparing the way in which different inspectors constructed the meaning of compliance with the Act. An understanding of this is critically important for evaluating enforcement behaviour and strategies. For example, if
compliance was constructed in such a way so that few, if any, serious hazards were found to be unlawful, then it would make little difference whether
we had a negotiated compliance model or a prosecution model. Both would
be equally passive and ineffective in improving workplace health and safety.
We must, therefore, look beyond the choice of enforcement strategy and also
examine the standard of compliance that was selected by the inspectors. In
particular, it will be useful to identify any differences in the way inspectors
Barber and Brown constructed the meaning of compliance, and relate that
to the differences we have already identified in their worldviews and their
enforcement strategies.
The meaning of compliance was, in many instances, far from clear on
the face of the statute. We have already noted that the open-ended language
used in many sections of the Act gave the inspectors a significant amount
For a study that attempts to measure the impact of different enforcement strategies on accidental rates in nineteenth century England see Bartrip & Fenn, "The Administration of Safety: The Enforcement Policy of the Early Inspectorate, 1844-1864," Public Administration, 58
(1980), 87.
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of discretion in determining the meaning of compliance. Further, manufacturers expressed great fears that this discretion might be exercised to their
detriment by inspectors sympathetic to the cause of labour. There is not much
direct evidence on how Barber and Brown interpreted the Act and its requirements, and so any conclusions must remain qualified. Nevertheless, I think
it is fair to surmise that, on the whole, the inspectors defined compliance
in a way that did not require employers to incur substantial costs in order
to alter their technology or work practices. Moreover, as between Brown and
Barber, Brown was the more demanding.
We have already seen that both the government and the inspectors were
willing to consider profits as a relevant criteria in enforcing the Act. This
was illustrated by Barber's comment on an amendment to the Act that enhanced the discretionary power of the inspectors.
Of course this leaves a great deal to the judgment of the inspectors, and may in some applications of it be the means of a difference of opinion arising between them and employers; but
I am sure that when such differences do arise, and the employers can give good reasons why
such dangers should not be protected, the inspectors will be reasonable, for they understand
it to be the wish of the Government that the Factories' Act shall be enforced in an efficient
manner, with as little friction and annoyance as possible.

To the extent that profitability was incorporated into the criteria of what
was reasonably necessary for the safety of workers, it would lead to a construction of the meaning of compliance which would not be terribly burdensome to employers.
Another reason for hypothesizing that compliance came to be constructed in a way that was favourable to employers arises from a sociological perspective on the interaction between inspectors and regulatees. It has been
noted that there is a tendency for inspectors to become more sympathetic
towards employers and their compliance problems after they have spent time
in the field.'" In part this may be explained by a desire to avoid the unpleasantness that is likely to occur in the face of a continuing adversarial
relationship. The nineteenth century factory inspectors frequently expressed
their relief that nothing of an unpleasant nature had occurred in the course
of carrying out their duties. Another cause of this phenomenon relates to
the symbolic dimensions of authority. Inspectors not only wanted to avoid
unpleasantness; they wanted the authority conferred upon them to be respected. This would be particularly true in the context of a situation in which that
authority was to be exercised with regard to persons who would otherwise
be considered to have a higher socio-economic status. The effect of this dynamic suggests that in negotiating the meaning of compliance, an employer

Inspectors of Factories, 1895, 7.
For contemporary evidence see Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden (Cambridge
1981), 184.
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who recognized the inspector's authority by indicating a willingness to take
some action in the future in response to the inspectors concerns would be
found to be in compliance with the Act by the inspector.58
The effect of these factors on the standard of compliance imposed by
the inspectors is uncertain. The inspectors indicated that in negotiating compliance with employers, they required improvements to be made. They also
claimed that significant improvements were taking place as a result of their
efforts. However, it is unclear how much weight we should give to the inspectors' self-evaluations, given the obvious incentives to promote a positive view of their work. For example, despite the continual assurance that
progress was being made, the same kinds of problems re-appeared year after year. Frequently it is difficult to determine whether an inspector is telling
us about actual changes, or is reporting on the extent to which the employer
has indicated a willingness to change in the future. The following excerpt
from a report by Barber typifies this ambiguity.
[I] am pleased to be able to report that I have been in all cases cordially received by employers, who with very rare exceptions, show every disposition to conform to the requirements
of the Factories' Act, so long as no great outlay of money is involved in making the changes
necessary to accomplish that object. . . .
The Inspector has at times to make suggestions that are not at all welcomed by the employer, and it is gratifying to me to be able to say that in the pursuance of my duties this year,
nothing of an unpleasant nature has occurred with any of the persons among whom my duties
called me, and, further, 1 have every reason to belleve that most of my suggestions have been
carried out, so far as time for doing so would permit, for some of them are of recent date.1"

Further evidence that the operative meaning of compliance generally
favoured employers comes from the fact that while the labour movement
regularly complained about inadequate enforcement, there do not appear
to be any complaints from business groups about excessively strict enforcement. Indeed, business groups sometimes praised the inspectors' behaviour.
At the annual convention of the CMA held in 1888 Secretary Nicholls reported
that, "the inspectors under the Factory Act have so far acted impartially
and that, whilst requiring that the provisions of the statute be respected, have
not caused undue friction by arbitrary interpretations of such provisions."140 Indeed, the following year Nicholls pointed to the Act's implementation as a vindication of the Association's decision not to oppose
the measure.141 The only other time CM discussed factory inspection was
"8This point is made by Hawkins in a contemporary study of pollution inspectors. "What the
polluter actually does by way of compliance is probably no more important for the field officers
than that some sign of compliance is made, a sign of respect for their ultimate authority symbolizing a willingness to comply." Hawkins, "Bargain and Bluff," Law & Politics Quarterly,
5 (1983), 35, 56.
'^Inspectors of Factories, 1891, 5-6.
"°CM, 17 Feb. 1888.
'"CM, 15 March 1889.
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when they came to the defence of Inspector Barber who had incurred the
displeasure of the TTLC for consenting to an alteration of the hours of work
that was not permitted by the statute."2
Notwithstanding that the above evidence suggests that, in general, the
meaning of compliance was constructed in a way that did not threaten to
disrupt the employers' business, there is evidence to suggest that Brown was
somewhat more exacting in his demands on employers than were his colleagues. This difference is found most clearly in a controversy over ventilation that erupted in the City of Toronto in 1899. On 24 October, 1899, the
Minister received a letter from D. J. O'Donoghue, Secretary, Legislative Committee, Toronto Trades and Labour Council, complaining of conditions in
a number of factories in Toronto. Some of those factories were in Brown's
district, others were in Barber's. The complaints were forwarded to the appropriate inspector. Barber reported on 3 November.
In no shop is the air as good as that outside and I suppose men working in such places
ten hours daily do feel a small proportion of dust—more than one making an occasional visit.
But in no factory visited did I find such a condition existing that would cause me to take action
without having a complaint first. Some of the employers I have spoken with expressed their
readiness to provide blowers if ordered to, but denied the need of them, and blamed the Polishers' Union for the present agitation.

Brown reported on 21 November.
Hitherto in the past, where only one machine has been in operation principally for buffing, I have not insisted on a fan being installed for the removal of dust.
Having had an interview with representatives of the Polishers and Buffers Union with regard
to the installation of fans in places where only one machine is in operation, they represent that
one man using a machine where dust is generated suffers in health from inhaling such dust and
his health should be protected as well as that of the workers where more than one machine is in use.

Brown recommended that fans should be installed, and sought a directive
of general application from the Minister on this point so as to assure uniformity in the enforcement of the Act. As well, he arranged to have Peter Bryce,
Secretary, Provincial Board of Health, inspect the factories in question. Based
on his inspection and a review of the medical literature, which even then recognized occupational disease from metallic dust, Bryce supported Brown's
recommendation. The Minister referred the matter back to the inspectors
for a common recommendation. None was forthcoming. In separate letters
both dated 8 January 1900, Brown recommended that a directive be issued
to the inspectors requiring the installation of fans, while Barber recommended
that the matter should be left to the discretion of each inspector.
The paper trail runs cold at this point and it remains unclear how the
controversy was resolved. However, the incident clearly illustrates how the
T"he matter involved the lengthening of the weekday working day in exchange for a shorter
workday on Saturdays. See CM, 2 Jan. 1891. For labour's views see Labour Advocate, 26 Dec.
1890, and 23 Jan. and 13 Feb. 1891.
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different assumptions and values of Barber and Brown influenced not just
their choices of enforcement strategy, but their appreciation of the standards
that employers were required to meet in order to bring themselves into compliance with the Act. Although there is no inherent reason why a more
prosecutorial strategy would be accompanied by more exacting standards,
our analysis suggests that the same factors that lead to one, also lead to the
other. This further points to the weakness of an analysis of enforcement that
focuses too strongly on the efficient allocation of scarce resources in the face
of external constraints. More prominence must be given to the ways in which
the mission of the enforcement agency and its officials are constructed.
II
Conclusion
legislation in the 1880s can be viewed as a
concession to the demand of workers that the state be empowered to insure
that minimally safe and healthy workplace conditions were provided by employers. The ability of workers to obtain concessions was not just a function
of their level of organization and ideological orientation, but was also aided
by presence of middle class reformers concerned about the impact of industrial capitalism on women and children who were drawn into factory work,
and by manufacturers who were resigned to having factory legislation as a
cost of obtaining the political support they needed for economic policies
designed to promote local industry. However, the goals that these groups
sought to achieve through factory legislation were contradictory. In particular, employer concerns over their profitability and freedom to control and
direct the labour process were, at least potentially, in conflict with worker
demands for safer and healthier work environments. The legislation itself
did not specify how these contradictory pressures were to be resolved, leaving it instead to the implementation process. The critical importance of the
implementation process was recognized by both workers and manufacturers
from the time factory legislation was first proposed, and it was in this process
that workers suffered their most serious defeats.
There can be no doubt that, from the outset, the resources devoted to
enforcement were woefully inadequate. This was an unavoidable reality for
the inspectors and obviously limited their options in developing an enforcement strategy. As well, they faced other constraints including government
attitudes and the difficulties of detecting violations and gathering evidence
that could be used to prosecute employers. However, these constraints were
either a direct function of, or significantly exacerbated by, the structural inequality of class power which manifested itself in the political and economic
spheres. Thus, even if it could be maintained that the decision to adopt a
THE ENACTMENT OF FACTORY
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negotiated compliance strategy was based entirely on the determination that
it made the most efficient use of resources, the significance of class power
on the ability of the state to regulate against the interests of capital would
still not be negated. Furthermore, scarce resources and other external con
straints limited the effectiveness of any strategy of enforcement, even if the
most efficient one was selected.
It is also not clear that, even in the face of the problem of scarce resources
and other constraints, efficiency dictated the virtual abandonment of prose
cution as a weapon in the inspectors' armory. A number of recent writers
on enforcement have suggested that an efficient enforcement strategy requires
a mix of tactics, including prosecution for firms that cheat or « n o n cooperative." On the assumption that not all Ontario employers were an
gels the virtual absence of prosecutions raises a serious doubt that the in
spectors chose the most efficient strategy.
I have also argued that the selection of an enforcement strategy by the
inspectors cannot fully be understood without recognizing the significance
of their worldviews. The predominant view was that worker carelessness was
the most important cause of accidents; that employers were socially respon
sible; that there was no fundamental incompatibility between the interests
of labour and capital over factory regulation; and that women, and particu
larly children, required special protection. From this perspective, educating
workers and employers on occupational health and safety appeared to be
a reasonable approach. As well, with the exception of Brown, the inspectors
accepted the intensification of the labour process and expected workers to
adapt to it. They knew, however, that these changes did result in more work
place injuries, but viewed these an unpreventable. Thus, it seems, they ac
cepted the fundamental legitimacy of an industrial capitalist system, and saw
the role of the state and its agents as one of reacting to, and limiting, the
excesses of that system, not controlling its normal consequences. The excesses
were seen to relate almost exclusively to its failure to provide special protec
tion to women and children, and with respect to children, working class par
ents were seen to be at least as guilty as the manufacturers.
This worldview was not uniformly shared by the first factory inspectors
in Ontario, but it is clear that Brown was the exception. He represented a
continuing link between working class politics and ideology of the 1880's
and the implementation of the factory legislation it promoted. The triumph
of "Barbarism" can be understood in part as a consequence of the triumph
of industrial capitalism over the alternatives espoused by groups such as the
Knights of Labour. Although this triumph was never total, it left in its path
a pattern of state interventions which succeeded in mediating and containM3For example, see Scholz, "Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement," Law ά Po
litics Quarterly 6 (1984) 385 and Braithewaite, To Punish or Persuade (Albany 1985), 119-148.
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ing class conflict through relatively minor legislative concessions that were
administered compatibly with the industrial capitalist order.1"
The choice of a negotiated compliance model of enforcement, in conjunction with the construction of the meaning of compliance which accepted many risks commonly present in workplaces resulted in the resolution of
the ambiguities present in the legislation in ways that were compatible with
employers' interests in profitability and the maintenance of control over the
labour process. This suggests that the compliance or persuasion model of
enforcement adopted by the majority of inspectors did not, in practice, turn
out to be much of an enforcement model at all. Rather, it closely resembled
a capture model in which the agency and its officials stop trying to alter the
behaviour of the regulated.'45
The pattern of enforcement that was established in nineteenth-century
Ontario was, by no means, unique to this Province or, indeed, to this period. It was literally the "conventional" wisdom of the time, and still prevails
today."6 An understanding of the origins of these views may not explain
their persistence, but it does suggest that they are deeply rooted in, and determined by the structural inequality between labour and capital that is typical of industrial capitalist social formations.14'
/ wish to thank my research assistant Nancc Kleee whose enthusiasm and
resourcefulness greatly contributed to this paper. I would dlso like to thank
Harry Glasbeek, Neii Gunningham, Craig Heron and Andrew RaRachanfor
their comments on earlier drafts.
l44

For other instances of this pattern see, MacCallum, "Keeping Women in Their Place: The
Minimum Wage in Canada, 1910-25," Labour/Le Travail, 17 (1986), 29, aan Craven, Impartial Umpire.
I45
I am unsure what Hawkins had in mind when he wrote, "To regard a compliance strategy
of enforcement at field level, or the formulation of prosecution policy at headquarters as symptomatic of the capture of the regulators misses the point. The practice of regulatory enforcement expresses an identity of moral values which transcends the regulator-regulated relationship."
Supra note 000, 207. If all he meant is that the regulators and the regulated share common
values formed outside of the relationship, I find the statement unobjectionable, although incomplete. Kelman's Regulating America suggests that values aller as a resull of the relationship. However, in a context in which the applicable norms are a matter of dissensus, and in
which the interests of labour and capital are in conflict, the existence of an identity of values
between the inspectorate and employers does not transcend the notion of capture; rather, it
becomes indicative of its establishment.
l4
*The international dimensions of this dominant worldview can be seen in Barber's citation
of English inspectors in support of his views. These views were routinely presented at the conventions of the International Association of Factory Inspectors. For a particularly good example see the speech of Rufus Wade, Chief Inspector of Massachusetts, in International Association
of Factory Inspectors, Convention Proceedings (1896), 32. That convention was seld in noronto and attended by the Ontario inspectors.
With respect to subsequent periods, preliminary research into the period between 1900 and 1914
indicates that negotiated compliance became the exclusive model of enforcement, and that not-
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withstanding the inspectors' glowing self-evaluations, the accident and injury rate rose quite
dramatically. For a critical analysis of the current state of occupational health and safety regulation in Ontario see Tucker, "The Persistence of Market Regulation of Occupational Health
and Safety: The Stillbirth of Voluntarism," in England, éd., Essays in Labour Relations Law
(Toronto 1985), 219. The most recent affirmation of this approach is to be found in McKenzie
and Laskin, Report on the Administration of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Toronto 1987) where the authors dismiss the view that workers and employers have a conflict over
health and safety, and that the imbalance of power between them must be redressed, with the
assertion that, "In the view of this study, these assumptions are inaccurate." (Vol. I, C. 2, p. 9).
l47
For an interesting discussion of the impact of historical patterns on current practices see Carson, "Hostages of History: Some Aspects of the Occupational Health and Safety Debate in
Historical Perspective," in Creighton & Gunningham, eds., The Industrial Relations of Occupational Heallh and Safety (Sydney 1985) 60.
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